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How to Build a Mixed-Criticality System in Industry?
— From the perspective of system architecture
Double Blind
Abstract—In the last decade, the rapid evolution of diverse
functionalities and execution platform led safety-critical systems
towards integrating components/functions/applications with dif-
ferent ‘criticality’ in a shared hardware platform, i.e., Mixed-
Criticality Systems (MCS)s. In academia, hundreds of publi-
cations has been proposed upon a commonly used model, i.e.,
Vestal’s model. Even so, because of the mismatched concepts
between academia and industry, current academic models can not
be exported to a real industrial system. This paper discusses the
mismatched concepts from the system architecture perspective,
with a potential solution being proposed.
I. INTRODUCTION
Safety-critical systems play an important role in many
medical and industrial fields [33]. In safety-critical systems,
integrating components with different levels of criticality
(e.g., Automotive Safety and Integrity Levels (ASILs) in ISO
26262 [19].) onto a shared hardware platform has become
increasingly important [13]. This results from the diverse
functionalities required by modern safety-critical systems (e.g.,
automated driving [27]), and the rapid evolution of execution
platform [32]. Such systems are called Mixed-Criticality Sys-
tems (MCS)s [6], [9].
Nowadays, the popularity of MCS has been raised to an
unexpected height in both academia and industry. In academia,
almost 300 papers related to MCS have been published in the
recent decade, and tens of related papers are still published
each year [9]. In industry, requirements regarding ‘integrat-
ing applications with different criticality levels in a shared
platform1’ have been added in the almost all safety-related
standards [15], e.g., DO-178C, EN50128, ISO26262, etc..
However, numerous unsolved challenges lead to a dilemma
of building MCS practically [9], [15], e.g., optimization of
system model, effectiveness of task allocation and resource
management etc.. From the experience of the machine learning
community, a unified direction between academia and industry
can significantly accelerate the developments of the whole
area. However, the mismatches between academia and industry
are currently slowing down the development of MCS. Some
mismatches have been already recognized by different re-
searchers and engineers. For instance, Graydon and Bate [17]
highlighted different meanings of ‘criticality’ are applied be-
tween research models and industrial standards. Ernst and
di Natale [13] argued that a fundamental methodology in
academia (i.e., graceful degradation) is not applicable in an
industrial system, because of the potential causes of the
disastrous consequences. Esper et al. [14] highlighted that
1Formal definition (including naming) and specific requirements of MCS
have not been finalized yet.
the importance of isolation is not sufficiently considered in
academia.
A. System Architecture in MCS
System architecture is a conventional and important topic
in embedded and computing systems, but it has been rarely
considered in the MCS arena.
It is very important to consider MCS from the perspective
of the system architecture. Specifically, no matter how com-
plicated the model built in academic research, and how the
perfect standards listed in industrial standards, a consistent
target of the activities is ‘achieving a MCS can be applied in
the real world’; and the first step of the target is building the
system architecture correctly. Hence, the system architecture
can be deemed as a vital interface/connection between industry
and academia in the MCS area.
B. Contribution
This paper is the first work considering MCS from the
system architecture perspective, which specifically discusses
the vital mismatches in academia and industry, and proposes
potential solutions from the perspective of the system architec-
ture. Due to the limitation of pages, a prototype MCS architec-
ture, specific design details, related analysis, and experimental
evaluation are planned to be presented in our next paper.
It is important to highlight that the objective of this work
is not to judge the correctness of different understandings
of MCS. Instead, the main intention is showing the impacts
of mismatches in MCS between academia and industry, and
trying to provide solutions from the rarely considered system
architecture perspective. The author sincerely wishes a fre-
quent communication between academia and industry in the
future.
II. THE STATE-OF-THE-ART IN ACADEMIA
Mismatches/gaps of MCS between academia and industry
can be equally discussed 1) from research models to industrial
standards, and 2) from industrial standards to research models.
This paper starts with a review of the state-of-the-art in
academia.
In the last decade, most of the MCS related research
proceeds from the real-time community [14]. Most (not all)
of the works about MCS are based on a model proposed by
Vestal [35], which is also mainly discussed in this paper2.
2In order to make the discussion more generic, the concepts of the earliest
Vestal’s model is extended in this paper, please also see Esper et al. [15].
The model assumes that the system has several modes of
execution (i.e., L ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, ...}), and contains a finite
set of sporadic tasks. Each task τi is defined by its period
(Ti), relative deadline (Di), a criticality/assurance level (li),
and a set of worst-case execution time (WCET) estimates
({Ci,1, Ci,2, Ci,3, Ci,4, ...}
3.). The different WCET estimates
are meant to model estimations of the WCET in the differ-
ent system modes. Specifically, the measured WCET from
the normal system mode might be used as Ci,1, whereas
at each higher system mode, the subsequent estimates (i.e.,
Ci,2, Ci,3, Ci,4, ...) are assumed to be obtained by more pes-
simistic WCET analysis techniques or by considering safety
margins imposed by certification authorities. The system ini-
tializes from mode 1 (i.e., L = 1), and all the tasks are
scheduled to execute on the core (s). During the run-time,
if the system is running in the mode k (i.e., L = k), and if
any task τi exceeds its execution budget (i.e., Ci,k), the system
will switch to the mode k+1 (i.e., L = k+1). Meantime, tasks
with criticality level less than k (e.g., l < k) are suspended.
It is important to highlight that this paper describes
Vestal’s model from a generalized perspective. In the earliest
model [35], only a single-core MCS with two system modes
(i.e., Low- and High-criticality modes) is discussed. After-
wards, the research model was further extended by different
researchers, e.g., the extension on multiple system modes and
criticality levels, re-activation of the dropped tasks, consider-
ation of a multi-core and many-core architectures, etc.. (see
Burns and Davis [9]). In the context of the theoretic model,
practical frameworks are also being developed (e.g., Missimer
et al. [28], Kim et al. [26], etc.).
A. System Architecture of Academic MCS Models
Details of implementation (including system architecture) of
MCS are rarely discussed in academia. Most (not all) of the
works about MCS just simply treat it as a normal embedded
architecture [9]:
Hardware Level. To the best of our knowledge, the essential
hardware requirements of Vestal’s model are never discussed.
Even though some papers introduced hardware architectures
within a MCS context (e.g., [5], [23], etc.), the requirements
are always ignored.
OS Level. In order to achieve the extra privilege (compared to
the application level), a system monitor in charge of the mode
switch has to be implemented in the OS level [29]. Meantime,
the system monitor can be implemented in different ways.
For example, Kim et al. [26] achieved the system monitor via
modifying the Linux kernel; Missimer et al. [28] implemented
the system monitor as an additional hypervisor.
Application Level. Applications with different criticality lev-
els (l) are implemented in the application level. As summa-
rized by Burns and Davis [9], isolation between applications
is an essential requirement of Vestal’s model. However, the
3The model assumes: Ci,1 ≤ Ci,2 ≤ Ci,3 ≤ Ci,4, ...
detailed requirements of isolation have not been specified,
which is even ignored by most of the academic research.
Based on the review and discussion, a preliminary system
architecture of the academic MCS model can be built in
Figure 1.
Fig. 1. System Architecture of Vestal’s Model in System Mode k (L = k)
However, the current system architecture of the academic
model (e.g., Figure 1) can not be applied to an industrial
product directly, because of mismatches between academic
model and industrial standards.
III. INDUSTRIAL CONCEPTS REGARDING MCS
Currently, the requirements of MCS are not clearly guided
by any safety-related standards from industry. In this section,
we introduce the concepts related to MCS, followed by a
specific discussion with system architecture perspective in
Section IV.
A. Context
In order to make the discussion precise, the context of
this paper is restricted in automotive systems, which is a
classic safety-critical system developing towards MCS. In the
automotive industry, ISO26262 [19] is the key guidance of
safety concepts, which is extended from IEC61508 (a generic
safety standard for all the electrical/electronic/programmable
electronic (E/E/PE) elements). Hence, this paper mainly dis-
cusses the MCS-related concepts in ISO26262 and IEC61508.
Note that, the concepts regarding MCS in automotive sys-
tems are very similar to other safety-critical systems (e.g.,
avionics, railway, etc.), and the discussion in this paper is
generic to be applied to other areas.
B. Criticality Level Assignment
Four different criticality levels are supported in ISO26262,
which is named as Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL)
(i.e., l ∈ {A,B,C,D} and A < B < C < D). The
determination of the criticality level is normally achieved via
safety analysis, i.e., Hazard Analysis (HA), Failure Modes and
Effects Analysis (FMEA), and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)4.
4Description of the methodologies and specific procedures do not help the
discussion of this paper, please see ISO26262 [19] or related textbook.
Here, we only describe the three parameters directly deter-
mining the criticality levels, as the first industrial concept of
this paper (IC-I), i.e., severity, exposure, and controllability5.
TABLE I
INDUSTRIAL CONCEPT I (IC − I ):
CRITICALITY LEVEL DETERMINATION
Severity Exposure Controllability
C1 C2 C3
S1
E1 QM QM QM
E2 QM QM QM
E3 QM QM A
E4 QM A B
S2
E1 QM QM QM
E2 QM QM A
E3 QM A B
E4 A B C
S3
E1 QM QM A
E2 QM A B
E3 A B C
E4 B C D
S: Severity, E: Exposure, C: Controllability, QM: Quality Management
As shown in Table I, severity, exposure and controllability
are used to define the criticality levels of the functions.
Generally speaking, the severity defines the estimation of the
extent of harm to one or more individuals that can occur in a
potentially hazardous situation, the associated exposure is the
likelihood of the occurrence of harm, and the controllability
is the ability to avoid a specified harm or damage through the
timely reactions of the agents involved (e.g. the driver of the
vehicle) possibly with support from external measures.
C. Integrating Multiple Criticality Levels
Not only in ISO26262 but also almost in all the safety-
related standards, an essential requirement regarding ‘integrat-
ing tasks with different criticality levels in a same platform’
is given (industrial concept II (IC-II)):
‘If freedom from interference between elements implement-
ing safety requirements cannot be argued in the preliminary
architecture, then the architectural elements shall be devel-
oped in accordance with the highest ASIL for those safety
requirements. (ISO26262-3:2018)’
D. Criticality Level Decomposition
Criticality level decomposition is one of the widely used
methodologies in industry, which ‘allows the apportion of
the ASIL of a safety requirement between several elements
that ensure compliance with the same safety requirement
addressing the same safety goal.6. (ISO26262-9:2018)’ — i.e.,
industrial concept III (IC-III), see Figure 2 for an example.
In the design of an industrial automotive system, criticality
level decomposition can be found in both hardware and
software (e.g., software redundancy). Hence, the impacts from
criticality level decomposition in MCS have to be particularly
analysed and discussed.
5A specfic description of the 3 parameters is outside the scope of this work,
please see ISO26262 [19].
6A specfic description is outside the scope of this work, please see
ISO26262-9:2018 [19]
Fig. 2. Example of Criticality Level Decomposition
IV. MISMATCHES BETWEEN ACADEMIA AND INDUSTRY
Mismatches of MCS concepts between academia and in-
dustry have been already discussed and analysed by different
researchers and engineers, e.g., [13], [14], [17]. Some of the
mismatches have been correctly recognized and fixed in the
latest research. For example, in the early academic research,
the concept of criticality level was assigned to both system
and applications, and caused confusions [17]. Recently, the
‘system criticality level’ has been changed to ‘system mode’,
in order to distinct with ‘application criticality’.
This section discusses the still existing mismatches, and
analyse them from the perspective of system architecture.
A. Hardware Level
In academia, requirements of hardware are never specifically
discussed. No matter the practical frameworks or the exper-
iments within the context of academic models, the hardware
platforms are not particularly selected [13].
Criticality Level Assignment. As defined in safety-related
standards (e.g., IEC61508, ISO26262), different criticalities
are also assigned to the hardware, which lead to the different
requirements in the design and verification.
Nowadays, commonly used safety-critical systems in indus-
try are not particularly designed for a MCS execution context.
In automotive systems, only a single-criticality system can be
supported by the latest MCUs/SoCs targeting safety-critical
systems from the world’s top 3 (in terms of market share)
automotive semiconductor suppliers [3]: FS-SBCs [2] in NXP
Semiconductors, PRO-SIL family [1] in Infineon Technolo-
gies, and the RHx series [4] in Renesas Electronics are all
developed towards the same direction: satisfying the highest
criticality level of the hardware platform, with increased scal-
ability, reduced complexity and decreased power consumption
compared to traditional safety-related methodologies, rather
than supporting a MCS context.
As strongly regulated in IC-II, due to lack of sufficient sepa-
ration/isolation to provide freedom from interference between
elements with different criticality levels, the whole hardware
platform used to achieve a MCS is required to inherit the
highest criticality level of the applications in the software.
Criticality Level Inversion. As described in the previous
sub-section, current hardware platforms are not particularly
designed for a MCS context, which may cause criticality level
inversion during the system mode switch. Taking a classic
extension of Vestal’s model, i.e., Adaptive Mixed Criticality
(AMC) [7], as an example, whilst the system executes in the
high-criticality mode, low-criticality tasks are terminated to
ensure the execution of high-criticality tasks. However, low-
criticality tasks may have outstanding requests/instructions un-
derway at the hardware level. Instructions/requests latched in
the pipelines of the CPU(s) can be easily removed via specific
instructions. However, already requested I/O operations, which
are latched in the hardware buffers, cannot be cleared timely.
In this case, the requests from low-criticality tasks that are
already sent still block the accesses of I/O requests from high-
criticality tasks — i.e., criticality level inversion.
With an increased number of processors and frequency
of I/O requests [20], [24], criticality level inversion may
significantly reduce the effectiveness of the system mode
switch, and further cause the corruption of the whole system.
Hence, in order to avoid the criticality level inversion in MCS,
the platform is required to support the function ‘remove the
already request I/O instructions from hardware’.
B. OS level
As shown in Figure 1, drivers, Operating System (OS), and
system monitor are the three key components in the OS level.
The implementation of the components can be either combined
or separated.
Criticality Level Assignment. There are two possible situa-
tions of assigning criticality levels to the drivers and OSs:
• If applications with different criticality levels access
shared drivers and OS, the drivers and OS are required
to keep the highest criticality level of the system.
• If applications with different criticality levels access
separated and independent drivers and OSs, the drivers
and OSs are required to inherit the criticality level of
the accessing application. For example, virtualization and
kernel separation [28].
When it comes to the system monitor, according to IC-II,
the system monitor is required to inherit the highest criticality
level of the applications in the software, because all the tasks
have to be dependant on the system monitor for resource
sharing and system mode switch.
System Monitor and System Mode Switch. As reviewed
in Section III-B, system mode switch is the key strategy
in academia, which guarantees the execution of the more
critical tasks. Specifically, the system starts from a low-
criticality mode and can be changed to a higher-criticality
mode in a predefined condition (e.g., over-execution of a task),
which causes the termination of the low-criticality tasks. This
procedure has to be achieved via a privileged system monitor
(e.g., hypervisor), which is implemented in the OS level by
most of the practical works within the context of academic
models.
However, system mode switch is a key mismatch of MCS
between academia and industry — i.e., system mode switch
is never defined by any safety-related standards (according
to the best of our knowledge). As discussed by Graydon
and Bate [17], and Ernst et al [13], ‘terminating/killing tasks
in any criticality level can potentially cause a catastrophic
consequence’.
Consider that, to bridge this key issue, it is very vital
to understand the conclusion from Graydon et al. [17] and
Ernst et al [13], which leads to an earlier stage before
academic model – i.e., criticality level assignment (see IC-
II in Section III-B). As shown in Table I, the criticality
level is directly determined by three parameters, i.e., severity,
exposure, and controllability. Among these parameters, only
severity indicates the severity class of terminating a specific
module. Therefore, with the system mode switch, terminating a
low-criticality task can cause a more severe consequence than
terminating a high-criticality task. For example, terminating
an ASIL A task with {S3, E2, C2}7 is much more dangerous
than terminating an ASIL B task with {S1, E4, C3}.
Within a sufficient consideration of the industrial context,
two more items are also required to be considered during
system mode switch:
• Dependency: If a high-criticality application is dependant
on the inputs from a low-criticality task, terminating a
low-criticality application will also cause the corruption
of the high criticality application, also see IC-II in
Section III-B.
• Criticality Level Decomposition: As introduced in IC-
III, Section III-D Criticality level decomposition is a
commonly used methodology in industry, which allows
a high-criticality component to be decomposed to sev-
eral low-criticality components. Hence, in a MCS with
criticality level decomposition, simply terminating all the
low-criticality tasks during system mode switch will also
significantly corrupt the system [8].
Although system mode switch is an undefined concept in
industry, it can be somehow linked to ‘graceful degradation’
— i.e., a technique aimed at maintaining the more important
system functions available, despite failures, by dropping the
less important system functions. [19]
Hence, determining the right ‘important functions’ (rather
than the high-criticality functions) and terminating the ‘less
important functions’ is a methodology to implement system
mode switch in industry. Here, we propose a two-level analy-
sis: (see Figure 3).
• Step 1: Failure Modes Effect Analysis (FMEA)8: The
impacts of terminating each task in the current system
mode shall be analysed. Any task can cause catastrophic
consequence from its termination has to be kept in the
next system mode, i.e., important tasks.
• Step 2: Dependency Analysis: The dependency of the
important tasks (output from step 1) shall be analysed.
Any task that can cause corruption of an important task
due to its termination, has to be kept in the next system
mode.
7In ISO26262, a large number indicates a more critical situation.
8The description of FMEA is out-of-score, which can be found in
ISO26262 [19] or any text book of safety.
Fig. 3. 2-Level Analysis for System Mode Switch from Mode k to Mode
k + 1
The output of the two-step analysis is the complete task set
for the next (more critical) system mode.
Response Time Analysis. Due to introduction of the two-level
analysis, the response time analysis of the MCS model has to
be re-considered.
Similar as the academic model (i.e., Vestal’s model), the
response time of the proposed industrial model has to be
analysed in three phases, i.e., current system mode, next (more
critical) system mode, and system mode change [35]. The only
difference between the two analysis is the kept tasks in the next
system mode. Due to the limitation of the pages, a specific
analysis will be presented in our following paper.
C. Application Level
Tasks/applications with different criticality levels are nor-
mally implemented in the application level. As presented in
the previous sections, almost all the research works focus on
the schedulability and shared resource management among the
tasks.
While integrating the tasks with different criticality lev-
els, the essential requirement of industrial MCS is separa-
tion/isolation, see IC-II, Section III-B, which can be further
expanded to:
• Temporal Isolation: tasks with different criticality levels
shall be temporally separated, in order to avoid malfunc-
tion caused by consuming too high processor execution
time or by blocking a shared resource by one task.
• Spatial Isolation: tasks with different criticality levels
shall not exchange data (including using shared memory).
• Fault Isolation: Fault(s) from one task shall not be
propagated to tasks with different criticality levels.
Temporal isolation is one of the main targets of the aca-
demic models, and TDMA-based methodologies are com-
monly used. For example, Carvajal and Fischmeister [10]
proposed an open-source framework (Atacama) for real-time
Ethernet for MCS. Cilku et al. [11] introduced a TDMA-based
bus arbitration scheme. Goossens et al. [16] used a TDMA-
based approach to schedule concurrent memory requests of
the same physical memory. Even so, TDMA-based approaches
cannot satisfy the requirements on spatial and fault separation
and usually leads to resource waste.
Data and fault isolation are typically achieved via two
approaches:
• Physical separation segregates the tasks by allocating
unique hardware resources to tasks with different criti-
cality levels.
• Virtual separation: separate the components by estab-
lishing partitioned hardware provisions that allow mul-
tiple software components to run on the same hardware
platform.
Due to the lack of a hardware platform particularly designed
for MCS (see Section IV-A), achieving physical separation
can only utilize the technologies designed for other purposes,
e.g., ARM TrustZone. ARM TrustZone technology is centered
around the concept of two hardware-enforced protection do-
mains (secure world and non-secure world). Each world is
granted uneven privileges, with non-secure software prevented
from directly accessing secure world resources. LTZVisor [30]
and TZDKS [12] proposed MCS architectures using TrustZone
technologies, by implementing high-criticality tasks in the
secure world and low-criticality tasks in non-secure world.
In virtual separation, virtualization technology is mostly
used. Specifically, the virtual machines (VMs) are logically
isolated in a virtualized system, which means the applications
executed in one VM can never affect another VM, even if
it breaks down. This is highly linked to the requirement on
isolation of data and fault. For example, Groesbrink et al. [18]
and Li et al [28] utilised hypervisor-based virtualisation to
separate system to independent partitions (i.e. VMs). Multi-
PARTES [34] and BlueIO [22] used para-virtualisation [31]
to establish an I/O virtualization system for a MCS. In these
methodologies, different system modes are assigned to the
VMs, and a secondary scheduling between the VMs is also
built to guarantee the more critical requests can be served ear-
lier. However, virtualization technologies involve complicated
resource management and complex path of instructions, which
significantly affect the performance and predictability of the
system, which is also the essential requirements of a real-time
system [21], [25].
D. Industrial Architecture of MCS
Based on the discussion in previous sub-sections, the indus-
trial MCS model is shown in Figure 4.
As shown in Figure 4, shared components among tasks with
different criticality levels inherit the highest criticality of the
executing tasks, including hardware platform, drivers, system
monitor, and OS. Meantime, tasks and OS with different
criticality levels are separated in the independent environment,
in order to avoid interference from time, space and faults.
V. CONCLUSION
Mixed Criticality Systems (MCS)s are a vital direction of
safety-critical systems in both academia and industry. How-
ever, due to the mismatched concepts between academia and
industry, it is nearly impossible to export an academic MCS
model to an industrial system directly. This paper specifically
Fig. 4. System Architecture of Ideal Industrial MCS Model (System Mode L = 1)
discusses and analyses the mismatches from a rarely consid-
ered perspective (i.e., system architecture), with the potential
solutions.
The key intention of this paper is encouraging more frequent
communication between academia and industry, which is able
to accelerate the evolution of the MCS area significantly.
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